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INTRODUCTION

A judicial opinion performs many functions. It announces the
decision, explains the reasons for the decision, provides a basis for
analysis of the development of legal rules, guides judges of lower
courts and trial courts as to controlling precedent, serves as a
source that lawyers consult to analyze obligations and rights of
clients, informs counsel's judgments about potential litigation,
and provides grist for formal legal study.1 Judicial opinions also
"teach people in society what actions conform to the law."2 Thus,
lawyers, but
not only do judicial opinions inform the litigants and
3
they also inform other citizens and public officials.
A judicial opinion is most effective when it adequately
addresses the issues in the case under consideration and when it
explains how rules from precedent apply or can be adapted to the
facts and issues in the case at hand. Conversely, an opinion is
least helpful when it announces rules that are not supported in
precedents cited or when it makes unelaborated repetition of language from prior cases without adequate explanation or analysis
of how that language applies or is being adapted to resolve issues
in the case at hand.
When the court fails to fully analyze a case, or announces
rules that lack precedential support, the use of judicial opinions
becomes difficult. Perhaps all judges, attorneys, legal analysts
including law professors and students, and other readers of judicial opinions at some time have confronted troubling deficiencies
in judicial opinions when trying to determine the precedential
value of a case or its application to the facts of a case at hand,
particularly when the case might be close to the margin of developed rules or at the borderline between two or more rules.
Similarly, treatises writers and casebook editors at some time
have probably found it difficult to completely synthesize a line of
cases in a topic area when there are deficiencies in the judicial
opinions which they must consult.
In the discussion of this article, the term "boilerplate" is used
to denote language in judicial opinions which is plucked from prior
cases in whole and inserted into an opinion without adequate
1. See generally, Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and
Citationof Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 119 (1994).
2. Martineau, supra note 1, at 123.
3. Id. (citing Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies, Advisory
Council for Appellate Justice, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions 1
(1973)).
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analysis of the applicability of that language to the issues or facts
of the case at hand. The phrase "decisional litany" is used to characterize the practically verbatim repetition of language from prior
cases in subsequent judicial opinions without sufficient inquiry
into the adequacy and appropriateness of the language as applied
to the case at hand.
This article discusses four selected examples from the tort law
of North Carolina .4 These examples isolate instances in which
the result of a case might not have warranted the language used
or when the language of the cases was picked up and carried forward in subsequent cases without adequate analysis. Perhaps
attorneys can point out these problems to the courts, and perhaps
the courts might choose to make helpful clarifications.
II.

FOUR

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF PROBLEM AREAS

Four topics have been selected to illustrate the instances
when judicial opinions do not serve as the most helpful to perform
a basis for analysis of legal rules. The topics concern landowners'
obligations to a class of entrants onto the property; the types of
and bases for libel actions; the requirements for determining when
intentional private nuisances may be found and related considerations that govern remedial alternatives; and the imposition of
strict liability for harms caused by "vicious" domestic animals.5
These examples are offered for the constructive purpose of highlighting the problems that the lack of clarity creates for lower
courts, trial court judges, lawyers who are advising or representing clients, analysts of judicial opinions (such as treatise writers),
and citizens at large.
4. Problems in these four torts areas were first noticed by this writer while
engaged in preparation of the treatise NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS. 1991.
The Michie Company. Permission is granted to the CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW to
reprint selected portions from NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS by CHARLES E.

DAYE and MARK W. MORRIS. The Michie Company, Charlottesville, VA, (800)
446-3410. All rights reserved.
Because of the limited objective of that treatise to set forth the law as it
appeared to be rather than to fully explicate and propose modifications of the law
to comform to what the authors believed it should be, this article has been
developed to explore more fully several proposals for remedying the deficiencies
in the four areas discussed in this article.
5. Whether other torts are non-torts areas might evidence any of the
problems identified is beyond the scope of the analysis undertaken here.
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Landowners' Duty to Licensees: Is There .Really No Duty to
Warn of Passive Hazards?
A social guest is visiting the landowner. The landowner sees the
guest about to walk onto the covering of a concealed hole, knows
that the covering will not support the weight of a person, and
knows that the guest does not know of the hole and cannot see it.
Should the landowner be required to warn the social guest?
1.

Classificationof Persons on the Land

In North Carolina the duty owed to persons on the land-6
owner's property depends, in general, on the status of the visitor.
An entrant may be classified as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.7
A licensee is a person who enters onto the property with permission of the owner, but otherwise for his own purposes." The landowner or occupier does not owe the licensee the duty to keep the
premises in a safe condition, 9 but owes only the duty to refrain
from injuring her either willfully or wantonly, or injuring her by
increasing the hazard to her through "active or affirmative"
negligence. 10
2.

The Problem of Licensees and Passive Conditions

The boilerplate language problem arises with respect to passive conditions, such as obstructions and pitfalls on property, and
the duty owed to licensees regarding those conditions. Some
North Carolina Supreme Court cases state not only that the landowner owes no duty to make the premises safe by removing such
obstructions, but also that the landowner does not have any duty
6. Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 540, 107 S.E.2d 154, 158
(1959) (actionable negligence on defendant's part when invitee fell into an
uncovered pit beside defendant's walkway).
7. Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 459, 181 S.E.2d 787, 790, cert.
denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971) (lessor not liable to lessee's social
guest injured when porch railing gave way since lessor had no duty to keep the
premises in repair).
8. Hood, 249 N.C. at 540.
9. Pafford v. Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730, 736, 9 S.E.2d 408, 412 (1940) (where
plaintiff entered premises for his own purposes in order to inspect building
materials and he was not invited to do so, he was held to be a licensee in that
mere permission involves license but it gives no right).
10. Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 461, 181 S.E.2d 787, 792, cert.
denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971) (defendant land occupier (lessee) not
liable to plaintiff, a social guest, injured when back porch railing gave way,
without a showing of willful or wanton negligence).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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even to warn a licensee of hidden perils, such as pitfalls, of which
the landowner knows and the licensee does not know."
A cursory reading of these cases suggests that the rule stated
above is black letter law in North Carolina, and that licensees
injured by hidden perils on a landowner's property cannot recover
for their injuries simply by arguing that the landowner failed to
warn them of the peril. Analysis of the cases, however, casts substantial doubt on the proposition that a landowner, in the ordinary case, is not under a duty to warn a licensee of hidden perils
on the property of which the landowner knows and of which the
licensee does not know, at least when the landowner knows the
licensee is about to encounter the condition or pitfall. This is as it
ought to be; for it is difficult to believe that the law would countenance a landowner's failure to warn, for example, a social guest on
the premises whom the landowner saw about to walk onto the covering of a concealed well, when the landowner knew the covering
was rotten and would not support the weight of a person.
One reason liability might arise in the above situation could
well be that in such circumstances the landowner's failure to warn
would be considered "wanton" or "willful" behavior. Wanton and
willful behavior may be found to exist where a defendant's "conduct is 'needless,' manifests no rightful purpose, and shows reckless indifference to the interests or rights of others; or is done
purposely and deliberately in violation of law; or is knowing and
'of deliberate purpose' not to discharge some duty necessary for
the protection of the person or property of another." 12 At the very
least such inaction by the landowner in a circumstance such as
that hypothesized would seem to create a jury question as to
whether the landowner's conduct was wanton or willful. Moreover, to characterize the conduct as wanton or willful may, in
11. See, e.g. Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N.C. 172, 177, 195 S.E. 364, 367 (1938)
(defendant not liable for death of licensee, an employee of contractor or agent of
the state Highway Commission coming onto his property, who fell into
excavation which caved in); Pafford v. Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730, 736, 9 S.E. 2d
408, 412 (1940) (where plaintiff entered the premises for his own purposes in
order to inspect building materials and he was not invited to do so, he was held to
be a licensee in that mere permission involves a license but gives no right);
Brigman v. Fiske Carter Const. Co., 192 N.C. 791, 795-96, 136 S.E. 125, 127
(1926) (active negligence in backing truck into vehicle in which plaintiff licensee
was sitting).
12. CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRis, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS,
§ 17.32 (Michie, 1991) (citing Wagoner v. North Carolina R.R., 238 N.C. 162, 77
S.E.2d 701 (1953).
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many cases, result in too strong a remedy, opening the landowner
to a claim of punitive damages, even under recently restricted
standards.1 3 And a characterization of the conduct as wanton or
14
willful would preclude the defense of contributory negligence,
which is still applied in North Carolina. 5
The second, and frankly, the better reason that a warning
would be necessary is that, notwithstanding the broader statements in the cases, no Supreme Court case has been found that
would exonerate a landowner's failure to warn a licensee, whom
the landowner both knew was on the premises and knew was
about to encounter a dangerous concealed hazard known to the
landowner, but not known to the licensee. In all of the cases on
this subject found and analyzed, the broader language purporting
to adhere to a "no duty to warn" rule was not required to decide
the case on the facts presented, or the case was or should have
been decided on different or narrower grounds.
The case which comes closest to sustaining the no duty to
warn a licensee rule is Monroe v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co .' In Monroe, the plaintiff, treated as a licensee, fell into a concealed pit on the landowner's premises across which the plaintiff
was taking a short cut.1 7 The plaintiff, who had used the short cut
apparently for over a year did not know of the pit, as it had been
concealed by a growth of weeds and shrubs.' 8 Judgment for the
plaintiff pursuant to jury verdict was reversed, the Court concluding that the landowner's motion for non-suit should have been
granted.' 9 The Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff was
using the short cut at her own peril and that the landowner had
not been shown to have breached any duty owed to the plaintiff.2 0
Monroe does not mention whether the landowner knew that
persons were using the property as a short cut. But because the
evidence showed the path was clearly defined, it can be reasonably
13. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-15 (1995) ( restricting punitive damages to "clear and
convincing evidence" that "fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct" existed;
added by ratified House Bill 729, 1995 Session , Chap. 514).
14. Young v. Warren, 95 N.C. App. 585, 383 S.E.2d 381 (1989) (defense of
contributory negligence not available if jury finds defendant's negligence
amounted to willful or wanton injury).
15. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 12, § 19.21.1.
16. 151 N.C. 373, 66 S.E. 315 (1909).
17. Monroe, 151 N.C. at 374, 66 S.E. at 316.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 377, 66 S.E. at 318.
20. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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inferred that the landowner had at least constructive notice of the
use of the property as a short cut. However, the pit had been created some two years before the plaintiffs injury.2 ' Importantly,
the facts do not show and the court does not discuss whether the
landowner knew the pit had become concealed by weeds and
shrubs. If the evidence did not show that the landowner was
aware not merely that the pit existed, but that it constituted a
concealed danger, the case cannot fully stand for the proposition
that the landowner had a duty to warn, because the duty exists
only with respect to conditions that the landowner knows about
and which he knows are both concealed from and unknown to the
licensee.
Finally, in modern terminology, the plaintiff seems not really
to have been a licensee at any rate; she was a person trespassing
on a limited area subject to constant trespass. THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS suggests this classification, and provides for

liability only when the condition is one which the landowner has
reason to believe that trespassers will not discover.22 Thus, if the
landowner does not know that persons who enter will not discover
the condition, it might well be that the landowner is not under a
duty to warn of it.
Notwithstanding its arguably broader language Dunn v.
Bomberger23 does not actually support a rule that there exists no
duty to warn licensees of passive conditions. First, the case
involved an employee of the state, and, although called a licensee,
the employee was privileged to enter the property without regard
to the landowner's consent. Such persons have generally created
classification problems.24 Second, the Court pointed out that the
landowner had not created the concealed condition, but rather
that the state itself had made excavations which made the property dangerous. 25 Third, the Court actually held that the landowner could not foresee or be charged with a duty to foresee that
agents of state (of which plaintiff was one) would create the condition and thus the landowner was not negligent.26 Fourth, the
Court opined that the deceased was negligent for failure to dis21. Monroe, 151 N.C. at 374, 66 S.E. at 316.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 335 (1965).
23. 213 N.C. 172, 177, 195 S.E. 364, 367 (1938).

24. See

W.PAGE KEETON ET AL.,

PROSSER AND KEETON,

on the

LAw OF ToRTs

§ 61, at 428-29 (5" ed. 1984).
25. Dunn, 213 N.C. at 177, 195 S.E. at 368.

26. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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cover the condition or discovered it and negligently continued to
work in face of a recognized danger. Finally, the Court thought
it would be so "oppressive" that, under the circumstances, it could
not conceive of requiring the landowner to give the state Highway
Commission notice (since the Commission's employees had created whatever danger existed) or to require the landowner to exercise "a higher degree of omniscience" with respect to probable
dangers than the employees of the Highway Commission were
required to exercise.28
Pafford v. J.A. Jones Construction Co. 2 9 similarly does not

support a rule of no duty to warn. First, there were warning signs
posted to "Keep Out" of the building under construction which the
plaintiff licensee ignored.3" Thus, it is difficult to see the case on
its facts as involving an instance in which no warning was given.
Therefore, any statement made in the case that a warning was not
required is classic dictum. Second, the plaintiff, as an experienced
person in the plastering business, according to the Court, was
fully aware that the building was not in a state of repair. 31 Thus,
it is difficult to classify the case as one in which the condition
either was concealed or was a condition of which the landowner
was aware and of which the licensee was not. Third, the opinion
does not make clear whether the landowner actually knew the
plaintiff was on the premises at the time of his injury. Fourth, the
Court made the statement regarding the lack of a duty to warn
while speaking of the landowner's capacity to have discovered the
defect by the exercise of reasonable care. 32 But the rules have

generally not required landowners to make inspections to discover
defects in the case of licensees. Fifth and finally, the Court also
treats the plaintiff as having been contributorily negligent or as
33
having assumed the risk: "He took his chances and lost."
Brigman v. Fiske-CarterConst. Co. 3 4 announces the proposi-

tion that as to passive conditions the landowner owes only a duty
to avoid wanton and willful injury to a licensee. The passive condition rule has no influence on the holding of the case, however.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 176-78, 195 S.E. at 368.
217 N.C. 730, 736, 9 S.E. 2d 408, 412 (1940).
Id.
Id. at 737, 9 S.E. 2d at 412.
Id. at 736, 9 S.E. 2d at 412.
Id. at 737, 9 S.E. 2d at 412.
192 N.C. 791, 795-96, 136 S.E. 125, 127-28 (1926).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3

8

1996]

Daye: Judicial Boilerplate Language as Torts Decisional Litany: Four Pr
JUDICIAL BOILERPLATE LANGUAGE

367

The holding of the case concerns the landowner's active negligence
in backing a truck into the vehicle in which plaintiff was sitting. 5
At best, therefore, the statement regarding passive conditions is
pure dictum. Moreover, Brigman does not address the issue of
warning as to passive conditions, either as a separate duty or as
possibly constituting wanton negligence in the circumstances posited in the case.
Both Gibbs v. Southern Ry. Co. 3 6 and Clark v. Cleveland Drug
Co. 3 7 cite the "no duty to warn rule," but are decided on contribu-

tory negligence grounds. In Gibbs, the plaintiff was barred from
recovering for injuries sustained after she was struck by a gangplank that was on the defendant's passing train. 3 The Court held
that because the plaintiff was not exercising any care for her own
safety, the defendant was not liable for her damages.3 9 In Clark,
the defendant was not held liable for injuries suffered by the
plaintiff after she fell into a trap door in defendant's store. 40 The
Court held that the injuries resulted from the plaintiffs lack of
due care. 4 ' In both cases, the boilerplate "no duty to warn" rule
was announced in the broader language of the case, but the case
was decided in favor of the defendant on different grounds. The
Court in Gibbs and Clark did no more than repeat a rule which
had no effect on the holding of either case.
In later cases, the Supreme Court has shown apparent reluctance to apply the "no duty to warn" rule in cases that are susceptible to alternative analyses and dispositions. For example,
Freeze v. Congleton,42 decided more than half a century after the
Court adopted the "no duty to warn licensees" rule, does not men-

tion such a rule. The plaintiff in Freeze, a five year-old licensee,
sued his aunt to recover damages for injuries sustained when he
walked through a sliding glass door.43 The plaintiffs aunt had
closed the glass door soon after the plaintiff entered through it
once, and failed to warn him of the changed condition.4 4 The rule
applied by the Freeze Court is essentially that a landowner's duty
35. Id. at 797, 136 S.E. at 128.
36. 200 N.C. 49, 156 S.E. 138 (1930).
37. 204 N.C. 628, 169 S.E. 217 (1933).

38. Gibbs, 200 N.C. at 50, 156 S.E. at 139.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Clark, 204 N.C. at 630, 169 S.E. at 218.
Id.
276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970).
Id. at 179, 171 S.E. 2d at 424.
Id., 171 S.E. 2d at 425.
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of care to an infant licensee is suspended when the parent of the
infant is present, in which case the duty to warn of defective conditions falls on the parent.4 5 The Court ruled in favor of the
defendant because the duty to warn the plaintiff of the closed door
fell upon the plaintiffs mother.46 Although the Court's holding is
based on a rule concerning the duty owed to child licensees, this
case seems to be one in which the Court might have at least mentioned that an exception to that general "no duty" rule exists with
respect to a child encountering even a passive condition. That
exception imposes a greater duty on landowners to children than
would be required to adult licensees.
But this approach would have been problematic, because it
can cut both ways. Even under the general "no duty to warn" rule,
the landowner's closing the glass door shortly after the plaintiff
had entered through it could be interpreted as increasing the hazard to the plaintiff through affirmative negligence, or even as wanton or willful conduct if one considers the experiences and
understandings of a child five years old. Liability in such an
instance could be imposed regardless of the presence of the child's
parents, unless the Court had imported the parental presence consideration into its consideration of the no duty rule. But the Court
does not mention the "no duty to warn" rule.
The court's reluctance to apply the "no duty to warn" rule is
also apparent in Cupita v. Carmel Country Club.47 In Cupita, the
plaintiff was injured when he fell into a hole on the defendant's
lawn while walking along a pathway that was not intended for use
by the defendant's invitees.48 Because the plaintiff had exceeded
the scope of his invitation at the time of his injury, he was classified by the Court as a licensee and, as such, the Court held that
the defendant was not charged with any duty to warn him of the
hole in the lawn.49 Although the holding of Cupita can be rationalized as not inconsistent with the "no duty to warn" rule, the
Court included in its opinion a substantial discussion of the effect
the plaintiffs contributory negligence would have had on his ability to recover. 50 After confidently stating that the defendant did
not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff under the no duty to
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 182, 171 S.E. 2d at 426.
Id., 171 S.E. 2d at 427.
252 N.C. 346, 113 S.E.2d 712 (1960).
Id. at 348, 113 S.E. 2d at 714.
Id. at 350, 113 S.E. 2d at 715.
Id. at 351, 113 S.E. 2d at 716.
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warn rule, the Cupita Court, nevertheless, stated alternatively
that the defendant could prevail because of the plaintiffs contributory negligence. 51
There also exists an additional consideration in determining
whether Cupita can stand for the proposition that there is "no
duty to warn licensees of concealed conditions of which the landowner knows." The plaintiff did not prove that the defendant was
aware of the hole in the lawn, and there is no inference that the
defendant knew plaintiff was on the property or was about to
encounter the hole. Absent proof that the defendant knew of hole
and of plaintiffs presence, the "no duty to warn" rule could not be
accurately said to have been the basis for the court's decision.
Like Cupita, Clarke v. Kerchner52 cannot support the notion
that there is "no duty to warn licensees of concealed conditions of
which the landowner knows." The plaintiff in Clarke was injured
when the defendant's porch railing gave way, causing her to fall to
the ground. 53 In her witness statement, the defendant stated that
"she had never noticed that the porch railings were loose prior to
the time of the accident." 5 4 The owner or occupier only has the
duty to warn of conditions of which he knows. Because of an
absence of evidence that the defendant knew about the loose railings, she did not have an obligation under the "no duty" rule to
warn the plaintiff of the danger.
The Court's discomfort with the "no duty to warn" language
becomes more apparent when the Court fails to cite the rule in
cases in which the facts presented apparently make application of
the "no duty to warn" rule appropriate. The Court does not cite
the "no duty to warn" rule in Murrell v. Handley .55 In Murrell,
the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a rug on the
defendant's floor.56 The floor had been waxed the previous night,
but the plaintiff was not made aware of the changed condition.5 7
The Court ruled in favor of the defendant after a lengthy discussion about whether a person's slipping on a waxed floor is evidence
of negligence on the defendant's part. 58 The Court pointed out
51. Id.
52. 11 N.C. App. 454, 181 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E. 2d
241 (1971).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 455, 181 S.E. 2d at 789.
Id. at 458, 181 S.E. 2d at 790.
245 N.C. 559, 96 S.E.2d 717 (1957).
Id. at 561, 96 S.E. 2d at 719.
Id. at 560, 96 S.E. 2d at 718-19.
Id. at 562, 96 S.E. 2d at 720-21.
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that the plaintiff was a licensee, but never mentioned the duty
owed to licensees.5 9 Instead, the Court focused on the absence of
negligence in the defendant's conduct.60 This case appears to be
one in which the "no duty to warn" rule would have been appropriate. It cannot be known whether the Court avoided the rule,
because of a belief the rule is unfair and, consequently, avoided
applying it when the case could be decided on another basis.
Several other cases are sometimes cited for the proposition
that a landowner has no duty to warn a licensee, that the landowner knows is present, of hidden conditions that the landowner
knows about if he is aware that the licensee does not know of the
danger. But the holdings of the cases do not support the
proposition. 1
The lower courts seem to have carried forward the no duty to
warn language verbatim without significant analysis or any substantial attempt to determine whether the actual holding of the
Supreme Court cases supported the statement of no duty to
2

warn.

6

59. Id. at 561, 96 S.E. 2d at 719.
60. Id. at 562, 96 S.E. 2d at 720-21.
61. These cases include Quantz v. Railroad, 137 N.C. 136, 49 S.E. 79 (1904)
(where the public was licensed to walk through a railroad station, the railroad
company was not liable for injuries to a licensee who fell through a door located
12 feet from the walkway because he was outside the public area); Peterson v.
South & Western R.R., 143 N.C. 260, 55 S.E. 618, (1906) (active operation, not
passive condition; railroad had no reason to expect persons purchasing fruits and
who were not passengers to be on the train, and when licensee was thrown from
the train as it lurched forward in starting up, he could not recover because the
railroad breached no duty towards him, but note that the court said that" [If the
conductor, or anyone having control of the train, had seen the plaintiff on the car
he should have warned him that it was about to move." Id. at 267, 55 S.E. at
621); Brisco v. Henderson Lighting & Power Co., 148 N.C. 396, 62 S.E. 600 (1908)
(landowner who had no reason to anticipate presence of 13 year old trespassing
boy not liable under attractive nuisance doctrine); Money v. Travelers Hotel Co.,
174 N.C. 508, 93 S.E. 964 (1917) (decedent in hotel went down three corridors,
including one narrower than others, traversing over 120 feet, opened an insecure
door to a passenger elevator shaft and fell into the shaft was treated as, at best, a
licensee who was not injured by a hidden or concealed condition which the hotel
operator would have any reason to foresee as posing a danger since the danger
was not along or near the usual and customary route for entering and leaving the
hotel).
62. See, e.g. Kelly v. Briles, 35 N.C. App. 714, 242 S.E.2d 883 (1978)
(allegations that defendant landowner maintained abandoned mines which were
in danger of collapse, that to landowner's knowledge persons who were not aware
of the danger entered the mines frequently, and that landowner neither boarded
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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With respect to the issue of licensees and passive conditions
the North Carolina Supreme Court could go a long way toward
warding off possible confusion over the duty owed by adopting the
clearer rule established in a number of jurisdictions and promulgated in the stated in the Restatement 2d of Torts, which requires
the landowner to warn a licensee of concealed perils of which the
landowner is aware and the licensee is not. 63 Alternatively, the
Court could abolish the categories of invitee, licensee, and trespasser altogether and establish a duty of reasonable care, under
the circumstances, owed to everyone on the property.64 While this
approach would have a more sweeping portent, it would allow for
a flexible answer to the issue of when liability should be imposed.
It also would allow focus on the relevant considerations that
determine whether liability should be imposed, including such
concerns as the foreseeability of injury, the burden of precautions,
and alternative ways to avoid injury or reduce the chances of
up the mines nor warned of danger held insufficient to state a claim for relief). In
Kelly the court treats the entrants as licensees by suggesting that open use by
the public "implied an invitation.". Id. at 717-18, 242 S.E. 2d at 886. The better
analysis is that the entrants were, at best, constant trespassers on a limited
area. As noted previously, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 335 (1965)
would provide for liability only when the condition is one as to which the
landowner has reason to believe that trespassers will not discover the danger.
It is not altogether clear that the bare allegation that the plaintiff, who was
joined in the suit by his father, could not know or discover the dangerous
condition of the mine in question, at least not without some allegation of either
his age or mental state.
It should be noted for the sake of accuracy that the Kelly court apparently
misread the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965) (referring to the
provision as 1964) as requiring landowners to inspect premises for potential
dangers to licensees. 35 N.C. App. At 719, 242 S.E. 2d at 886. The Restatement
provision cited provides in Comment d., inter alia,that "Apossessor of land owes
to a licensee no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee's reception or to
inspect the land to discover possible or even probable dangers." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 cmt. D (1965). Also Haddock v. Lassiter, 8 N.C. App.
243, 174 S.E.2d 50 (1970), falls into the same pattern of carrying forward
language without substantial analysis.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1977).
Michigan, Washington, Ohio, Oregon, New York, Missouri, Kentucky,
Connecticut, Texas, Alaska, Arizona, Maryland, Virginia and Arkansas are
among the states that require a landowner to warn a licensee of hidden perils of
which the licensee is not aware and the landowner is aware.
64. Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois are among the states
that have abolished the categories.
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injury thereby permitting a focus on reducing the societal costs
injuries impose.65
Whatever steps the Court might choose to take to clarify the
rule, rather than leaving it as it currently stands, the effort would
undoubtedly be welcomed as helping to eliminate the confusion
facing landowners and occupiers, lower court and trial judges,
attorneys advising and representing clients (whether landowners
or claimants), scholars writing treatises, citizens, and others.
Further, a clarified rule would be more consistent with notions of
justice, at least to the extent that the broader unclarified boilerplate language could be positively misleading, in the sense that
one has a hard time believing that a landowner may with impunity watch a social guest face possibly grievous injury or death
while the landowner sat by without so much as yelling "watch
out!" when he saw the guest walking onto the rotted covering of a
concealed well. One cannot believe that our law would countenance such callous indifference or itself be so indifferent.
B.

Basis for Libel Action: Is there Really a Separate Category
of "DualMeaning" Libel?
A well-known entertainer is interviewed by a local newspaper
reporter. When the article is published, it contains statements
that the entertainer and a small number of readers interpret as
defamatory. Other readers do not interpret the statements in a
defamatory manner. Under what category of libel, if any, may the
entertainer base her cause of action?
1.

General Principlesof Defamation

The general distinction between libel and slander is that libel
is based on the publication of a written communication, a communication which embodies words in a physical form, or some other
means of communication having the likely harmful qualities of
defamatory printed words. Slander is based on the publication of
defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures or any
form of communication which is not sufficient for libel. 6 North
Carolina generally follows these distinctions.6 v
The Supreme Court in a series of cases has purported to distinguish between the three classes of libel: (1) libel per se, which
65. See generally, DAYE AND MORRIS, supra note 12, § 16.10.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977).

67. See generally, DAYE

AND MORRIS,
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is defamatory upon its face; (2) publications susceptible of two
interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the other not; and
(3) libel per quod, which is defamatory only when considered with
explanatory circumstances, innuendo or colloquium."
2. The Problem of "DualMeaning Libel"
The three-tiered categorization of libel, with the second tier
consisting of statements capable of having both a defamatory and
a non-defamatory meaning, apparently originated with the Court
in Flake v. Greensboro News Co. 6 9 Earlier courts had distin-

guished between defamation actionable per se and that not actionable per se.7 Such cases, however, cannot fairly be read as
creating a substantive and distinct category of libel involving two
meanings - one defamatory and one not (hereinafter called "dual
meaning" libel). The Flake court cited five cases as authority for
the dual meaning libel of which it spoke. However, it is doubtful
that a fair reading of any of the cases can support the substantively distinct category of dual meaning libel. One case cited is
Wright v. Commercial Credit Co. Inc.71 The Wright court held
that words susceptible to more than one meaning or having no
meaning to persons not familiar with the language used to
describe a particular transaction are considered to be ambiguous,
and require an allegation and proof that the alleged defamation
was published to a third party who understood the words to have
a defamatory meaning.
68. Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 251 S.E.2d 452 (1979) (directed verdict for
defendant was proper.)
69. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (libel per se claim not sustained; dual
meaning libel was not alleged).
70. See, e.g. Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N.C. 14, 169 S.E. 869
(1933). In Oates the court was dealing with slander, and the issue was whether
the alleged defamation was actionable per se as charging the commission of a
crime involving moral turpitude or only actionable per quod upon allegation and
proof of falsity, malice and special damages. The court said that if the words had
only one reasonable interpretation it was for the court to say whether the words
were defamatory, but that if the words were capable of two meanings one
defamatory and one not it was for the jury to determine which of the meanings
was intended and which was understood by the persons who heard the words.
This matter, of course, deals only with the role of the court and jury when
factual predicates must be determined. The holding really has nothing to do with
a second or middle substantive tier of slander, not to mention of libel.
71. 212 N.C. 87, 192 S.E. 844 (1937) (non-suit against plaintiff, no allegation
or proof that the alleged libelous words were published to anyone who
understood them to convey a defamatory meaning).
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A second case cited for the dual meaning category, Lewis v.
Carr,7 2 does not mention any category of dual meaning libel.
Lewis merely held that although the defendant's statement in fact
charged embezzlement or breach of official duty, misconduct, and
conversion of public funds, whether a charge of embezzlement was
intended by the defendants was a question for the jury.
The three other cases involve slander. The first of these
cases, Vincent v. Pace,73 held that the alleged statement of the
defendant to third persons who knew plaintiff, that the plaintiff
had stolen the defendant's chickens, was a jury question as to
whether the words were slanderous. The second case, McCall v.
Sustair,74 held that when the defendant allegedly told three people that the plaintiff stole cotton from him, the defendant's language was slanderous per se; however, the Court noted that if the
words had been ambiguous, the jury would have had to decide
what meaning was intended of the words.7 5 The final case, Lucas
v. Nichols, 7 6 required the jury to decide whether the defendant

slandered the plaintiff by allegedly saying to a third person that
the plaintiff was sexually promiscuous with slaves and that the
defendant would pay someone $25 to sleep with the plaintiff.
All of these cases, when accurately analyzed, will be seen to
stand only for the proposition that when words cannot be determined to be slanderous as a matter of law because they are capable of a non-slanderous meaning, what meaning was intended by
the defendant or understood by those who heard them is a jury
question. None supports dual meaning libel as a distinct category
of defamation.
72. 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919) (non-suit reversed; whether alleged libel
intended to charge the crime of embezzlement was for the jury).
73. 178 N.C. 421, 100 S.E. 581 (1919) (trial court erred in sustaining
defendant's demurrer because the allegedly slanderous words were ambiguous
but capable of a defamatory meaning thus the question of what meaning was
intended and understood was for the jury to determine).
74. 157 N.C. 178, 72 S.E. 974 (1911) (allegedly slanderous words used were
susceptible of more than one construction thus the trial court properly left the
question of intent and meaning to the jury as to whether the defendant intended
to charge the plaintiff with a crime and whether anyone so interpreted the

words).
75. Id. at 181, 72 S.E. at 975.
76. 52 N.C. 32 (1859) (because the allegedly slanderous words were
ambiguous and capable of a double interpretation it was proper for the judge to
leave it to the jury whether the slanderous meaning was intended).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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After the Flake decision, several cases have cited the Flake
language regarding a special middle-tier category of dual meaning
libel. No appellate case has been found which has sustained a
claim of libel when it was in the special dual meaning category
only; indeed, no appellate case has been found in which the plaintiff successfully has alleged dual meaning libel action. Of the
appellate cases found that do specifically identify and sustain a
particular form of libel allegation, only libel per se and libel per
quod allegations have been found sustained.
One case which repeats the dual meaning libel language of
Flake is Arnold v. Sharpe.77 In Arnold, the plaintiff's employer
allegedly left a memo on his desk describing someone as a gossip,
a troublemaker, and one who could not get along well with
others. 78 There was not a name on the memo; however, the plaintiff believed that the memo was written about her.79 Other
employees observed the memo on the defendant's desk, and the
plaintiff claimed to have suffered embarrassment.8 0 Although the
Arnold Court discussed the three distinct classes of libel in its
opinion, the discussion had no bearing on the holding of the case.
The case was decided according to the rule that defamatory words
are actionable only if they refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person."' Because the plaintiff was not identified in the
memo, she could not prevail in an action for libel.8 2
Renwick v. News and Observer PublishingCo. and Renwick v.
Greensboro Daily News Co. 8 3 also cites the Flake language but

does not support the dual meaning libel category. In Renwick, the
plaintiff sued two newspaper companies after they published an
article criticizing minority admissions at UNC-Chapel Hill, of
which the plaintiff was in charge.8 4 The Court concluded that, at
worst, the articles were susceptible of two interpretations, one
defamatory and the other not.8 5 The plaintiffs action was dismissed because plaintiff had alleged and admitted that his action
77. 296 N.C. 533, 251 S.E.2d 452 (1979).

78. Id. at 536, 281 S.E. 2d at 454.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 539, 281 S.E. 2d at 456.

82. Id.
83. 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984)
84. Id. at 314, 312 S.E. 2d at 405.
85. Id. at 315, 312 S.E. 2d at 408.
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was based only on a claim of libel per se which claim the court
found plaintiff had not met."6
In Ellis and Ellis Brokerage Co. v. Northern Star Co.,8 7 the

plaintiff alleged that letters sent to the plaintiffs buyers by the
defendant indicating that the plaintiffs prices were incorrect were
libelous per se.88 The Ellis Court dutifully quotes the dual meaning libel language of Flake8 9 , but the complaint and the holding in
the case speak to libel per se only.90 Similarly, the Court in R.H.
Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,91 cites the dual
meaning libel language of Flake although the plaintiff alleged only
libel per se.
In Robinson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 9 2 the Court suggests that

the plaintiffs case could fall into a distinct category of libel that
includes publications which are capable of two meanings-one
defamatory and one not. 93 The plaintiff in Robinson charged the
defendant with libeling him by publishing statements concerning
the cancellation of the plaintiffs insurance policy.94 The Court
held that stating that one's insurance policy has been canceled is
not libelous per se and that, because the plaintiff did not charge
the defendant with any other form of libel, his complaint did not
95
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
Although the Court cites the Flake language and suggests that
the plaintiff may have a cause of action under another type of
libel, the court does not identify the defendant's words as those
which fit into the dual meaning category. 96 The plaintiff did not
bring an action for dual meaning libel, and the Court never states
that the defendant's behavior constituted or may have constituted
dual meaning libel.
It appears that the second tier of dual meaning libel as a distinct category of libel has no vitality in North Carolina9 7 and, for
86. Id. at 320, 312 S.E. 2d at 410.
87. 326 N.C. 219, 388 S.E.2d 127 (1990).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 222, 338 S.E. 2d at 129.
90. Id. at 224, 338 S.E. 2d at 130.
91. 270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967).
92. 273 N.C. 391, 159 S.E.2d 896 (1968).
93. Id. at 393, 159 S.E. 2d at 898.
94. Id. at 391, 159 S.E. 2d at 897.
95. Id. at 395, 159 S.E. 2d at 899.
96. Id. at 394, 159 S.E. 2d at 899.
97. No other jurisdiction has been discovered that purports to have a form of
defamation for dual meaning libel as a distinct substantive category.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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all that can be determined, exists only in the boilerplate language
that subsequent courts picked up and carried forward from Flake.
At its first opportunity the Supreme Court should reconsider the
Flake language. Upon doing so it is hard to see what the court
could do but disavow it.
Disavowal would be appropriate, because the elements, the
pleading requirements, whether special damages must be alleged,
and other issues cannot be determined on the present state of the
law. If not disavowed, it is incumbent upon the court to spell out
the resolution of at least the basic dimensions of the action.
C.

Intentional PrivateNuisance: Should One Focus on the
Unreasonablenessof the Interference or of the Conduct?
An operator of an oil refinery purposely causes noxious gases to
escape into the air. His neighbor brings a nuisance action against
him asserting that the dangerous gases interfere with his use and
enjoyment of the property. In deciding whether the operator is
liable for nuisance, should the court focus on the unfair impact the
release of the gases has on the neighbor or on whether the operator employed reasonable measures to prevent the release of the
fumes?
1.

The Kinds of PrivateNuisance

North Carolina recognizes two kinds of private nuisances:
nuisance per se (or in law) and nuisance per accidens (or in fact). 98
Private nuisance per accidens or in fact is an act, conduct, or a
structure which is a nuisance by reason of its location or the manner in which it is constructed, maintained, or operated;9 9 whereas
a nuisance per se or in law is an act, occupation, or structure
which is a nuisance at all times regardless of location or surroundings. 10 0 An action for private nuisance may be based on the
98. Andrews v. Andrews, 242 N.C. 382, 88 S.E.2d 88 (1955) (reversing
demurrer for defendant; allegation that defendant maintained a pond on his land
next to plaintiffs property for the purpose of attracting wild geese and the geese
were destroying plaintiffs crops stated facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action
based on a private nuisance per accidens).
99. Id.
100. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 191, 77 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1953)
(evidence tending to show that defendant, in operating an oil refinery, purposely
and unreasonably caused noxious gases to escape into the air to such an extent
as to substantially interfere with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of land held
sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non-suit).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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intentional or unintentional creation of an unreasonable
interference. 101

2. Problems in IntentionalPrivate Nuisance
A nuisance is intentional if the person acts for the purpose of
causing the interference or invasion of plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land, knows that the interference or invasion is resulting from his conduct, or knows that it is substantially certain that
the interference or invasion will result from his conduct.1 0 2 If a
person intentionally creates or maintains a private nuisance, he is
liable to others regardless of the degree of care used to try to avoid
the harm.10 3 Not every intentional interference with another's
use and enjoyment of his land is a nuisance. 10 4 The key question
becomes what intentional interferences are nuisances. The general formulation defines nuisance as an unreasonable interference
that results from the defendant's conduct. 10 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court has used language which
beclouded the issue of whether the focus should be on the unreasonableness of the conduct of the defendant or should be upon the
unreasonableness of the invasion of the plaintiffs interest. Speaking of intentional private nuisance, the Court has stated that "It
is the unreasonable operation and maintenance that produces the
nuisance."'0 6 At other times the Court has clearly focused on the
101. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962)
(new trial for error in instructions in an action for nuisance per accidens; but
plaintiffs evidence of noise and vibrations from defendant's textile plant held
sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non-suit); Morgan v. High Penn Oil
Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953) (evidence tending to show that
defendant, in operating an oil refinery, purposely and unreasonably caused

noxious gases to escape into the air to such an extent as to substantially interfere
with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of land held sufficient to withstand
defendant's motion for non-suit).
102. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E. 2d 682, 689
(1953). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 (1965).
103. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962)
(new trial for error in instructions in an action for intentional nuisance per
accidens; but plaintiffs evidence of noise and vibrations from defendant's textile
plant held sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non'suit).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 822 Cmt. g. (1965).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1965).
106. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962)
(emphasis by the court) (new trial for error in instructions in an action for
intentional nuisance per accidens; but plaintiffs evidence of noise and vibrations
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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nature and quality of the invasion, or interference.10 7 In other
cases the courts have apparently focused on both concerns; that is,
they have looked at the defendant's conduct and looked at the
nature and quality of the interference.10
The focus on the invasion or interference appears to be the
correct focus when dealing with intentional private nuisance per
accidens.109 The focus should not be on the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct when dealing with intentional nuisance since
that question concerns nuisance based on negligence, and because
even reasonable conduct may unreasonably interfere with the
from defendant's textile plant held sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for
non-suit).
107. Id. (unreasonableness of intentional invasion; whether reasonable
persons would regard the invasion as unreasonable); Morgan v. High Penn Oil
Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194, 77 S.E.2d 682, 690 (1953) (intentional and unreasonable
invasion).
108. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977) (error
to instruct jury that it could find nuisance and then should consider damages to
plaintiff because jury could not find that a nuisance existed at all without finding
"substantial damage" to plaintiffs).
The Pendergrast court, however, made its statements in the context of a
nuisance action arising out of damage caused by the flow of surface waters as to
which the court was adopting a "reasonable use" standard to determine liability
for damages caused by flooding after defendant altered the flow of surface water.
While the court spoke of intentional private nuisance as the basis for the action,
it is clear that the substantive standard of "reasonable use" in actions involving
surface water must necessarily govern whether any action - nuisance or other would lie. Thus, Pendergrastmust be understood in its context, rather than as
stating general nuisance doctrine.
Moreover, when it turned to the question of liability for nuisance, it is quite
plain that the court focused on the "reasonableness" of the interference by
weighing gravity of harm against the utility of the defendant's conduct. The court
even noted that when defendant's conduct is "reasonable" in the balance sense,
liability may still be imposed for private nuisance if the interference is greater
than the plaintiff should be required to bear without compensation, citing
various sections of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS in drafts for the second edition.
Id. 293 N.C. 201, 217-18, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797
The Court of Appeals has similarly spoken of unreasonable conduct while
analyzing the unreasonable interference issue. Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197,
334 S.E.2d 489 (1985) (trial court erred in denying injunctive relief in a nuisance
action by concluding that defendant's hog farm was operated without negligence
and failed to balance the utility of defendant's conduct against the gravity of the
harm to plaintiff). However, since the issue was whether an injunction should be
granted, the court was in fact applying the requirement generally necessary
before an injunction will lie.
109. See generally, KEETON, supra note 24, § 86; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS §§ 826, 829, 830 and 831 (1965).
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plaintiff use and enjoyment of property. 11 0 The court has recognized that the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct - in the
sense of exercising skill and care in an attempt to avoid the injury
does not preclude liability for an intentional nuisance."1
When determining liability in cases of intentional nuisance, it
is given that the defendant intentionally caused the invasion, and
the question is whether the invasion was or is an unreasonable
interference with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property.
The question of what invasions and interferences are unreasona2
ble is determined by the circumstances in each case.1
If the jury determines that the invasion was unreasonable, it
must next determine whether the unreasonable interference with
the plaintiffs use and enjoyment was "substantial".1 3 The
requirement of substantial interference will be met if the plaintiff
shows an effect on the health, comfort or property of those who
live nearby which results in significant annoyance, material physical discomfort, or injury to the plaintiffs health or property. 1 4 A
110. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 87, p. 623 ("The two concepts unreasonable interference and unreasonable conduct - are not at all identical.");
Id. § 88, p. 629 ("Confusion has resulted from the fact that the intentional
interference with the plaintiffs use of his property can be unreasonable even
when the defendant's conduct is reasonable.")
111. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953)
(evidence tending to show that defendant, in operating an oil refinery, purposely
and unreasonably caused noxious gases to escape into the air to such an extent
as to substantially interfere with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of land held
sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non-suit).
112. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962)
(new trial for error in instructions in an action for intentional nuisance per
accidens; but plaintiffs evidence of noise and vibrations from defendant's textile
plant held sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non-suit); Hooks v.
International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d 387 (1965) (temporary
restraining order until time of final hearing on the merits affirmed; allegations
that the location of defendant's racetrack 2500 feet from plaintiffs church and its
operation on Sunday were sufficient to allege nuisance per accidens).
113. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953)
(evidence tending to show that defendant, in operating an oil refinery, purposely
and unreasonably caused noxious gases to escape into the air to such an extent
as to substantially interfere with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of land held
sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non-suit). See also Pendergrast v.
Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 221, 236 S.E.2d 787, 799 (1977) (error to instruct jury that
it could find nuisance and then should consider damages to plaintiff because jury
could not find that a nuisance existed at all without finding "substantial damage"
to plaintiffs).
114. Pake v. Morris, 230 N.C. 424, 42553 S.E. 2d 300,301 (1949) (affirming jury
verdict for defendants against claim that the fish factory was nuisance pursuant
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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"slight inconvenience or petty annoyance", of course, will not support a claim.1 1 5
Finally, reasonable persons, objectively looking at the entire
situation, taking into account plaintiffs, defendant's and the community's interests, must consider the interference unreasonable.
The question is not whether a reasonable person in plaintiff's or
1 6
defendant's shoes would consider the invasion unreasonable.
To determine whether defendant's interference is unreasonable, several factors must be taken into account: the surroundings
and conditions under which defendant's conduct is maintained;
the character of the location; the nature, utility and social value of
defendant's operation; the nature, utility and social value of plaintiffs use and enjoyment which have been invaded; the suitability
of the locality for defendant's operation; the suitability of the locality for the use the plaintiff makes of the property; the extent,
nature and frequency of the harm to plaintiff's interest; priority of
occupation between the parties; and other considerations arising
11 7
from the evidence.
It would be helpful to lawyers advising and representing clients, to trial judges, to analysts, and citizens generally if the
Court's holdings were consistent and clear that the rule provides
that a nuisance is created when the defendant intentionally
causes unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs use and
enjoyment of her or his land. The focus on the unreasonableness
of the defendant's conduct is erroneous. To the extent that the
cases do not make this matter clear the law is left with an undesirable lack of clarity.

to instructions which stated the rule of law set forth in text that accompanies
this note).
115. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 619, 124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962)
(new trial for error in instructions in an action for intentional nuisance per
accidens; but plaintiff's evidence of noise and vibrations from defendant's textile
plant held sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for non-suit).
116. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1965)). (new trial for error in
instructions in an action for intentional nuisance per accidens; but plaintiffs
evidence of noise and vibrations from defendant's textile plant held sufficient to
withstand defendant's motion for non-suit).
117. Id. These factors are very similar to those set forth in the RESTATEMENT
§ 826-31 (1965) and since the court has cited the Restatement with approval it
would appear that the Restatement would be strongly persuasive authority.
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Problems With Remedial Considerations

Considerable difficulty has been encountered in determining
what relief should be granted in cases of private nuisances.
Unlike public nuisances, many of which are crimes and thus are
indictable, private nuisances are actionable only for damages,
abatement by injunction, or both.1 " Relief granted in private nuisance cases may be temporary or final. 119
First, monetary damages for past harm might be granted.
However, in cases of conduct continuing into the future wasteful
successive and repeated lawsuits would be necessary. Thus, second, permanent damages might be granted covering past and
future harm. Third, a conditional injunction might be granted
which, in essence gives the defendant a choice: take measures to
avoid the interference or pay damages. Fourth, an injunction
might be granted prohibiting the defendant from carrying on the
activity at the location in question.
To award damages for harms caused by nuisance, the defend120
Of
ant's conduct, in and of itself, need not be unreasonable.
course, the interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of

his property must be unreasonable and must cause substantial
harm or there is no nuisance. 12 1 This distinction requires clarity
118. State v. Everhardt, 203 N.C. 610, 617, 166 S.E. 738, 742 (1932) (dictum)
(defendant indicted, convicted and fined for the maintenance of a public nuisance
for permitting a large number of people to gather, drink, holler, and use
profanity at a dwelling under her control).
119. Various kinds of temporary relief are possible, and these forms of relief
might require additional showings. See, e.g. Hooks v. International Speedways,
Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d 387, 393 (1965) (temporary restraining order until
time of final hearing on the merits affirmed; allegations that the location of
defendant's racetrack 2500 feet from plaintiff's church and its operation on
Sunday were sufficient to allege nuisance per accidens).
120. Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 199, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1985) (citing
KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 87, p. 622-23 (trial court erred in denying
injunctive relief in a nuisance action by concluding that defendant's hog farm
was operated without negligence and failed to balance the utility of defendant's
conduct against the gravity of the harm to plaintiff).
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1965) (an invasion is
unreasonable if the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the burden of
compensating this and similar harm to others would not make continuation of
defendant's activity infeasible). See also id. cmt. f. (it may be reasonable to
operate a harm causing activity which is important if payment is made for harm
caused but unreasonable to do so without payment).
121. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977)
(error to instruct jury that it could find nuisance and then should consider
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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in the focus on whether the conduct or the interference is unreasonable. A judgment that the defendant's activity has created a
nuisance but that his conduct is not unreasonable means, in effect,
that the activity is sufficiently valuable that it should not be
abated or altered but that the defendant should bear the burden of
costs for the harms inflicted. 122 Therefore, an injunction will not
lie in this situation.
It follows, therefore, that the granting of injunctive relief
requires proof that the defendant's conduct itself is unreasonable,
i.e. the gravity of the harm exceeds the utility of the defendant's
conduct. 123 In determining the gravity of the harm, factors to consider are the extent of the harm and the type of harm, the social
value which the law recognizes regarding the type of use which is
invaded, the appropriateness of the locale for that use, and the
burden on the plaintiff to minimize the harm. 124 To determine the
utility of defendant's conduct, factors to consider include the purpose of defendant's conduct, the social value which the law
attaches to that use, 125 and the impracticability of preventing or
avoiding the harm caused. 126 These factors must be considered
and a judgment made on the balance of the harm against utility
before a decision can be made as to whether injunctive relief is
proper. Failure to do so will be reversible error. 127 The gravity of
the harm will outweigh the utility of the defendant's activity in a
number of specific circumstances, listed by persuasive authority,
including when the defendant's activity is undertaken for the sole
purpose of harming the plaintiff,

28

is contrary to standards of

damages to plaintiff because jury could not find that a nuisance existed at all
without finding "substantial damage" to plaintiffs).

122.

KEETON ET AL.,

supra note 24, § 88A, p. 631.

123. Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985) (trial
court erred in denying injunctive relief in a nuisance action by concluding that
defendant's hog farm was operated without negligence and failed to balance the
utility of defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to plaintiff).
124. Id. (quoting Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977)).
125. Id.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1965).
127. Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985) (trial
court erred in denying injunctive relief in a nuisance action by concluding that
defendant's hog farm was operated without negligence and failed to balance the
utility of defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to plaintiff).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829(a) (1979).
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decency,129 is causing significant harm which could be avoided

without undue hardship,13 0 or is unsuited to the location. 3 1
If these distinctions are not clear it can become awfully difficult to determine not merely whether the defendant's conduct has
created a nuisance, but also importantly what remedy can and
should be granted if the plaintiff prevails. Society may need valuable activities that cause unreasonable interference. If this is so
that may mean that the plaintiff may not be granted an injunction
abating the nuisance, but it does not necessarily follow that
because injunction is not appropriate, the plaintiff should be left
without any remedy, such as damages, or permanent damages, in
appropriate circumstances.
Conversely, activities which are intentional, injurious, and
unreasonable may be good candidates for injunctive relief at least
against prospective injuries. These considerations can become
very difficult to keep in perspective if there exists confusion as to
whether the conduct or the interference is the focus of the action.
D. Strict Liability For "Vicious" Domestic Animals: Should One
Focus on the Defendant's Conduct or Her Knowledge of
an Animal's DangerousPropensity?
A jogger, on a daily run, is attacked by a dog owned by a neighbor.
If the jogger asserts that the owner should be held strictly liable,
should the court focus on whether the owner knew (or as a reasonable person should have known) of the vicious propensity of the
dog or should it focus on whether the owner acted unreasonably in
allowing the dog to roam freely where it might be able to attack a
pedestrian?
1. General Principlesof Strict Liability
When a plaintiff brings an action under the doctrine of strict
liability, she is not required to show that the defendant negligently or intentionally interfered with a protected interest .132
Generally, neither care nor negligence, good nor bad faith, knowledge nor ignorance will save the defendant in strict liability
cases.13' There are instances of strict liability contexts, however,
in which proof is required that the defendant had prior knowledge
129.
130.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs

§ 829(b) (1979).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

830 (1979).

131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 831 (1979).
132. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 75 at 534.

133.

BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY
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of the danger that caused the injury before he may be held strictly
liable. 134
The keeper of a domestic animal with a vicious propensity to
cause a particular type of harm is strictly liable for that harm if
the keeper knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, of that

propensity. 135
This strict liability rule first emerged in North Carolina in
1850, in a case of a bull that attacked and killed plaintiffs
horse. 13 6 The Court stated that once the owner knew of the bull's
viciousness, the owner was on notice sufficient to put him in the
wrong and make him liable for the consequences of his "neglect" to
keep the animal confined. 1 3 7 But the court's use of the word
"neglect" does not mean that the court was employing a negligence
analysis. The disposition of the case makes the court's approach
clearer:
When the owner knows or has reason to believe that an animal is
dangerous, on account of a vicious propensity in him, from nature
or habit (a term used to denote an acquired as distinguished from
a natural vice), it becomes his duty to take care that no injury is
done; and he is liable for any injury3 8which is likely to be the result
of this known vicious propensity. 1
In determining what knowledge the defendant possessed, or
is to be constructively charged with, the question is what the
defendant knew (actual knowledge) or what a reasonable person
in defendant's circumstances would have known (constructive
knowledge). 1 3 9 Thus, it is sufficient to get to the jury for the plaintiff to prove that the animal engaged in acts tending to indicate
that unless restrained, for example, it would be likely to inflict
134. Griner v. Smith, 43 N.C. App. 400, 405, 259 S.E.2d 383, 387 (1979)
(dangerous domestic animal; jury verdict for plaintiff based on negligence
affirmed when horse breeder allowed another horse to injure plaintiffs horse).
135. Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51, 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967) ("tame" dber
attacked plaintiff four times; owner found to have knowledge of the propensity at
the time of the fourth attack); Hill v. Mosley, 220 N.C. 485, 487, 17 S.E.2d 676,
677 (1941) (vicious bull butted plaintiff).
136. Cockerham v. Nixon, 33 N.C. 269 (1850) (vicious bull killed plaintiffs
horse; reversed for error in instructions regarding knowledge that the bull would
be likely to attack a horse).
137. Id. at 270.
138. Id. at 271.
139. Sanders v. Davis, 25 N.C. App. 186, 188-89, 212 S.E. 2d 544, 556 (1975)
(summary judgment for defendant improper in a case which apparently was
based on negligence; but the court noted that the gravamen of the action was the
"wrongful keeping of the animal with knowledge of its dangerous propensities).
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injuries. From this evidence a jury might infer that the defendants "had reason" to know that the animal had dangerous propensities.14 ° Another formulation of the test, which means the same
thing, is that the owner or keeper, as a reasonable person, "should
know" from past conduct that the animal would be likely to inflict
1
injury.

14

2. The Problem of Liability Basis
Unfortunately, the courts have often mixed the language of
fault-based liability when considering cases that appear to be
based on strict liability. Negligence concepts have often appeared
in cases that were based on strict liability. As one North Carolina
judge has stated the problem, "the gravamen of the action is not
negligence, yet [the courts] nevertheless apply the standard of a
reasonable person."142 Applying the reasonable person test to

determine the standard of conduct with which the defendant must
comply is fundamentally unsound and incorrect, if the liability is
based in strict liability. However, as noted, using the reasonable
person standard to determine whether the defendant had sufficient knowledge (establishing the scienter requirement) to be liable for harm caused by a vicious domestic animal is appropriate
and correct.
Many of the cases involving damages caused by domestic animals were premised alternatively on negligence or strict liability.
Plaintiffs often state alternative causes of action to increase their
chances of recovery. This fact has led to some confusing language
in the cases, and even to one opinion in the Court of Appeals
asserting that the Supreme Court has not authoritatively adopted
strict liability for injuries caused by vicious domestic animals. 143
The statement is not supportable, however.
Part of the confusion can be explained by some of the courts'
statements which suggest that the defendant's conduct is "wrongful" in keeping a dangerous animal with knowledge of its propen140. Miller v. Snipes, 12 N.C. App. 342, 345, 183 S.E.2d 270, 272 cert. denied,
279 N.C. 619, 184 S.E.2d 883 (1971) (summary judgment for defendant reversed)
141. Sanders, N.C. App. At 189, 212 S.E.2d at 556 (1975) (quoting from a

case in which the court discusses negligence).
142. Griner, 43 N.C. App. at 405-06, 259 S.E.2d at 387 (citations omitted)
(jury verdict for plaintiff based on negligence affirmed when horse breeder
allowed another horse to injure plaintiffs horse).
143. Id. at 407, 259 S.E.2d at 388 (juryverdict for plaintiff based on negligence

affirmed when horse breeder allowed another horse to injure plaintiffs horse).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/3
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sities."' In strict liability cases, liability is imposed without
inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct in
keeping the animal. A negligence standard, however, necessitates
inquiry into factors such as the kind of animal that caused the
harm, its usefulness to defendant's activities, the value of defendant's activity to the community, the alternatives, if any, the
defendant had for accomplishing the purpose without the animal,
and the care defendant exercised in attempting to prevent harm;
in other words, necessitates inquiry into the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct. When liability is imposed without considering such factors, strict liability is being imposed in the sense that
the defendant is not charged with unreasonable conduct in the
manner of keeping, restraining or tending the animal.
One can describe the keeping of the animal as "wrongful" if
the keeper knows of a dangerous propensity, but knowledge of a
not necessarily make it negligent in
dangerous propensity would
14 5
all circumstances to do so.
The Supreme Court has frequently stated:
"To recover for injuries inflicted by a domesticated animal...
plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the animal was dangerous, vicious, mischievous, or ferocious, or one termed in law as
possessing a vicious propensity; and (2) that the Owner or Keeper
knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensity,
character, and habits... The gravamen of the cause of action in
this event is not negligence, but rather the wrongful keeping of the
animal with knowledge of its viciousness; and thus both viciousness and scienter are indispensable elements to be averred and
proved.'"146

the rule of
Since 1850 a succession of courts have announced
14 7
strict liability in substantially these same terms.
144. See, e.g. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. at 188, 212 S.E. 2d at 556 (summary
judgment for defendant improper in a case which apparently was based on
negligence, but the court noted that the gravamen of the action was the
"wrongful" keeping of the animal with knowledge of its dangerous propensities).
145. See, e.g. Cockerham, 33 N.C. at 269 (vicious bull killed plaintiffs horse;
reversed for error in instructions regarding knowledge that the bull would be
likely to attack a horse).
146. Swain, 269 N.C. at 51, 152 S.E.2d at 301 (emphasis added) ("tame" deer
attacked plaintiff four times; owner found to have knowledge of the propensity at
the time of the fourth attack): The court accepted, as law of the case, that the
deer was tame and thus came within the rule governing domestic animals.
147. See, e.g. Sellers v. Morris, 233 N.C. 560, 64 S.E.2d 662 (1951) (mule
kicked plaintiff; demurrer on the grounds of failure to allege viciousness or
knowledge but rule of liability was said to be settled since the days of Moses,
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The second reason for the confusion is that a case of damage
or injury caused by a domestic animal may indeed be filed on the
basis that the keeper or owner was negligent in the manner of
keeping the animal or in other respects which led to the plaintiffs
damage. 148 In a negligence case, knowledge of a specific vicious
propensity is not required, but the keeper or owner of a domestic
animal is chargeable with knowledge of the general propensities
of certain animals and must exercise due care to prevent injury
from reasonably anticipated conduct. 1 49 Thus, it has been properly held that negligence may be found, when the facts will otherwise support a finding of a lack of reasonable care, without proof
that the animal had a vicious propensity and without proof that
the defendant had knowledge of a specific propensity. 50 This, of
course, is standard negligence law. The point is that when the
basis of the action is negligence, standard negligence principles
apply. 15 1 To avoid creating confusion, the courts must be certain
that they are not relying on cases decided on standard negligence
principles as precedent when they are deciding strict liability
cases.
A third reason for the confusion is attributable to the application of the reasonable person standard to assess the appropriateness of charging the owner with knowledge even when strict
liability is the basis for the action. 152 The defendant's actual or
citing Exodus 21:28,29); Plumidies v. Smith, 222 N.C. 326, 22 S.E.2d 713 (1942)
(principles governing recovery for being bitten by vicious dog said to be well
settled); Swain v. Tillet, 269 N.C. 46, 152 S.E.2d 297 (1967) (tame deer attacked
plaintiff four times; owner found to have knowledge of the propensity at the time
of the fourth attack); Griner v. Smith, 43 N.C. App. 400, 259 S.E.2d 383 (1979)
(jury verdict for plaintiff based on negligence affirmed when horse breeder
allowed another horse to injure plaintiffs horse);
148. Griner, 43 N.C. App. at 400, 259 S.E.2d at 383 (based on negligence and
citing negligence cases).
149. Id. (jury verdict for plaintiff based on negligence affirmed when horse
breeder allowed another horse to injure plaintiffs horse).
150. Id.
151. Lloyd v. Bowen, 170 N.C. 216, 221, 86 S.E. 797, 799 (1915) (negligence
may be found apart from knowledge of viciousness if defendant otherwise fails to
exercise reasonable care).
152. Griner, 43 N.C. App. at 400, 259 S.E.2d at 383 (jury verdict for plaintiff
based on negligence affirmed when horse breeder allowed another horse to injure
plaintiffs horse); Sanders, 25 N.C. App. at 186, 212 S.E.2d at 554 (summary
judgment for defendant improper in a case which apparently was based on
negligence; but the court noted that the gravamen of the action was the
"wrongful" keeping of the animal with knowledge of its dangerous propensities).
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constructive knowledge of the propensity which led to the plaintiffs damage is essential to the strict liability theory of recovery
for injuries by domestic animals.' 5 3 Unfortunately, when the
court applies the reasonable person standard. to determine
whether actual or constructive knowledge exists on the part of the
owner of a vicious domestic animal, negligence concepts inappropriately tend to sneak into the opinion.'6 4
Accordingly the courts must be keen to distinguish the basis
for the action. If negligence is the basis reasonable conduct in
keeping an animal is required. If the conduct is unreasonable in
light of whatever danger the animal posed, liability will be
imposed even when the animal may not have had a dangerous
propensity to injure. If strict liability is being imposed based on
the owner's keeping of a domestic animal that the owner knows or
should know has a vicious disposition, then liability is imposed
without proof that the owner was unreasonable. Determining
what the owner knew or should have known is judged by the reasonable person standard, even though the liability is strict. Thus,
the courts must be care to avoid boilerplate language of prior opinions and in the opinion at hand.
III.

CONCLUSION

North Carolina tort law is quite dynamic. Moreover, given
the volume of opinions produced one can only imagine the pressures that exist to move cases and write opinions quickly. In analyzing judicial opinions one can be quite impressed with the extent
to which courts and judges clearly and adequately state the
rationale of the case being decided. That has been true of most of
the opinions on tort law that have been analyzed by this writer.
Because the four areas set forth in this opinion do not consistently evidence the judicial crafting that one sees in other tort opinions, cases dealing with licensees, libel, intentional private
nuisance, and strict liability for domestic animals stand out as
particularly observable. It would be a major advance if these
153. Lloyd, 170 N.C. at 221, 86 S.E. at 799 (negligence case contrasting strict
liability as basis of recovery when defendant tied a high-spirited horse to a dead
tree limb, and left it unfed and unattended on a winter day, enabling the horse to
break loose and injure plaintiff).
154. See, e.g. Williams v. Tysinger, 328 N.C. 55, 399 S.E.2d 108 (1991) (stating
that an owner of a domestic animal is chargeable with knowledge of the general
propensities of certain animals and must exercise due care to prevent injury).
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observations served to influence advocates and judges to engage
the clarifying efforts needed in these areas.
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